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Abstract We argue that while moral objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate 
cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is 
implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's 
account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to 
explain extreme human behaviors. 
 
 
The lead paper argues that the distinctive psychology that regards moral properties as objective, 
external features of the world is adaptive because it allows us to engage in beneficial cooperation 
through correlated interactions. Implicit in the account are two theses: (1) the correlation thesis 
that moral commitment serves as a correlating device, allowing fellow norm-followers to 
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associate with each other and to ostracize defectors; and (2) the indispensability thesis that 
externalized moral norms of this sort are necessary to achieve pro-social cooperation, at least at 
the high rate seen in humans. 
 
We argue that the first thesis is plausible, but that it undermines the second thesis. If the 
correlation thesis is true, there is good reason to think that externalized moral attitudes are not 
indispensable for achieving cooperation, but are merely one possible solution among many. 
 
There is already a well understood set of mechanisms by which agents may ensure correlated 
interaction with fellow biological altruists. It is not clear how Stanford’s account is supposed to 
relate to this menu of options. Is it a type of reciprocity, costly signaling, group selection, or 
something else? We suggest there are three possibilities (not mutually exclusive) that are 
especially promising. 
 
Costly signaling models require a diversity of types in the population (e.g. cooperators and 
defectors), who – at least in simple cases – face differential signaling costs, or who stand to make 
differential gains from being believed. Some types can afford to send signal that are uneconomic 
for other type and, hence, any sufficiently costly signal is credible. Costly signaling mechanisms 
have been proposed to explain phenomena like unconditional sharing, costly punishment, 
apology, and guilt (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016; 
Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009) Could externalizing moral psychology be a form of costly signal 
also? 
 
It is conceivable. By rigid commitment to moral attitudes, an agent might incur a cost that a 
defector would not be willing to pay. But for this hypothesis to be plausible, we need an 
explanation for why externalized moral attitudes are especially burdensome or costly. Prima 
facie, it is hard to see that they are. Compared to better established examples of costly signals, 
including rituals such as fasting, bodily mutilation, and animal sacrifice, it does not seem like 
having the belief that moral requirements are objective features of the world is especially costly 
at all. 
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The greenbeard hypothesis is that altruistic traits are genetically linked to a distinctive 
phenotypic trait. If only altruists can develop green beards, then a strategy of cooperating with 
fellow green beards is a plausible evolutionary outcome. A genetic barrier to green-bearded 
defectors keeps the world safe for cooperation. Recent work (cf. Gardner & West, 2010) has 
shown that green beard mechanisms can sustain cooperation even if the link between beard and 
altruism is not strict, but permits some plasticity. The result is an unstable dynamic, in which the 
population cycles through different beard colors, with bursts of cooperation in the beginning of 
each beard cycle, followed by invasion by defectors, followed by development of a new beard 
color (Jansen & van Baalen, 2006; Traulsen & Nowak, 2007). Perhaps the best elaborated 
account of how these sorts of dynamic might explain actual human cooperation is the case of 
accents, which are certainly hard to fake, and are also not tightly linked to any particular genes 
(Cohen, 2012). 
 
Both costly signaling and greenbeard accounts undermine the indispensability thesis, however, 
because both imply that the cooperative correlating mechanism is arbitrary. Stanford emphasizes 
that the moral psychology which he seeks to explain appears to be cross-culturally robust. This 
makes it quite unlike rituals or accents, which vary dramatically across time and space.  
 
Finally, the most promising mechanism to underlie Stanford’s account is social selection. 
Suppose that a competitive mating environment exists in which fitness is enhanced by finding 
reliable long-term cooperative partners. In such a market, it is adaptive to have a reputation for 
being reliable. So, we predict adaptations that make one sensitive to reputation (cf. Haley & 
Fessler, 2005). Cooperative, altruistic behaviors may then be adaptive because they enhance 
one’s reputation—even if those behaviors are done cynically, for reputation enhancing reasons. 
The competitiveness of the mating market may then drive this process so that ever better 
demonstrations of reliability are required in order to obtain a mate. In this setting, it may be more 
cost effective to be reliable than to merely appear reliable (Sperber & Baumard, 2012). One 
particular way to be reliable is to take moral facts as external, objective demands. Notably, this 
process explains the development of ‘high’ quality types as emerging from a competition among 
lower quality types who are more self-serving in their pursuit of reputation. 
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This better explains the adaptive function of externalizing psychology in particular, but without 
more explicit modeling, it remains open that a population in equilibrium may have only a small 
minority who display this phenotype. The main mechanism –reputation sensitive coordination 
with the prevailing norms—may explain most observed cooperation. Indeed, this is plausible. 
Consider the evidence of social norms prevailing over moral commitments, revealed both in 
history and in experimental settings (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1972). Externalizing 
psychology is apt to fascinate philosophers, who are in the grip of related meta-ethical puzzles 
dating back to Plato’s Euthyphro, but this is not yet evidence that it plays a significant role in 
achieving actual cooperation.  
 
Debates about the genesis of human cooperation are unlikely to make significant advances 
without comparison of models “in the field”—using disciplines such as archaeology, 
ethnography, genetics, and experimental economics. This work, however, requires models that 
can deliver testable predictions. We await with interest to see whether Stanford’s proposal 
constitutes a novel mechanism, with novel predictions, or if it can be assimilated to existing 
mechanisms. We have suggested here that if it is assimilated to existing mechanisms, there is 
little hope for the indispensability thesis. The “categorical imperative” nature of moral 
commitments may be a contingent artefact of our idiosyncratic evolutionary history. 
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